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The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a speedy trial, but the United States Supreme Court has struggled to quantify what exactly constitutes a speedy trial. The high court has not been able to come up with a set number of days or months within which a trial must start to be considered “speedy,” and in 1972 the court conceded that it could do “little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right” to a speedy trial, and that courts would, therefore, have to decide “speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis”.
Congress responded by passing The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (The Act), which sets the standard of “speedy” as being seventy days. The Act is not meant to confer significant new rights on defendants, but rather was designed to implement and enforce the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and to insure uniformity of speedy trial procedures throughout the country; however, The Act specifically notes that it is not meant to bar Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims.
The Act generally requires that a person be formally charged within thirty days of arrest and that trial commence within seventy days after both the filing of formal charges and the appearance of the defendant before a judge, which would appear to truly bring the accused to trial quickly. However, as with most laws that attempt to reduce complex concepts into formalized rules, “the devil is in the details.”
The details in the Speedy Trial Act are the excludable time periods. In calculating the time required to bring a defendant to trial, the court subtracts certain periods of delay, such as delay caused by the need to conduct mental examinations on the defendant, delay caused by pretrial motions, delay caused by missing witnesses, or delay caused by a continuance granted when the “ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”
If the time limits established by the Speedy Trial Act are not met, the only remedy is dismissal. “In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [the Speedy Trial Act] and on the administration of justice.”
a. The “Ends of Justice” May Thwart Justice
Under the Speedy Trial Act, a judge may exclude “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”
A skilled defense attorney can use “ends of justice” continuances to delay proceedings almost indefinitely by requesting additional time for discovery, investigation, and testing. Courts are hard pressed to deny discovery based continuances because to do so could be viewed as unjustly harming the defense, the denial of effective assistance of counsel, the denial of the right to confront witnesses, the denial of due process, or the denial of any number of other rights that could result in reversal. Conversely, the prosecution can request their own “ends of justice” continuances, or force the defense to request continuances by simply withholding timely discovery. Either way, the delay is generally charged against the defendant instead of the prosecution, yet it is the defendant who is denied a speedy trial.
b. The “Ends of Justice” May Include Routine Investigation
One would expect the prosecution to substantially complete the investigation of even the most complex case before arresting the accused, yet an “ends of justice” continuance allows for exclusion of time based on case complexity.
There is no clear standard as to what constitutes “complex.” It might be reasonable for a court to find a fifty defendant case “complex” so as to exclude some time for case preparation, but the “complexity” loophole also allows the exclusion of time in rather ordinary cases.
Courts have considered a case to be complex based in part on the need for time to consider new case law or the need for time to consider whether or not to seek the death penalty - issues that surely cannot be considered novel.
U.S. v. Murray was a rather ordinary two defendant case where Mr. Murray was charged with various offenses for allegedly being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. A warrant seeking such contraband was executed. The sought after weapons were located, and Mr. Murray was arrested, but the prosecution wasn’t ready to proceed. While Mr. Murray remained in custody, the prosecution made an ex parte request for a time exclusion to allow time to check fingerprints and conduct further investigation before seeking an indictment. The Ninth Circuit found the request and the time exclusion proper. It is difficult to argue against complexity when courts allow the prosecution to present their arguments in such sub rosa proceedings.
c. Courts Do Not Agree About the Length of “Ends of Justice” Delays
The “ends of justice” exclusion has perplexed not only litigants, but also courts, which has resulted in three approaches to the rule: “limited in time”, “reasonable length”, and “defense waiver”.
Under the “limited in time” approach, the court “requires that an ‘ends of justice’ continuance be specifically limited in time and that there be findings supported by the record to justify each ‘ends of justice’ continuance. Otherwise one early ‘ends of justice’ continuance could exempt the entire case from the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act altogether, and open the door for wholly unnecessary delays in contravention of the Act’s purpose.” Congress felt it appropriate to set the time for trial to commence at seventy days, but a “limited time” exclusion for the “ends of justice” allows courts to set their own time limits.
Under the “reasonable length” approach, “open-ended continuances to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in length.” What is “reasonable in length” is judged on a case by case basis with no firm test. This approach simply ignores the time limits set by Congress, and allows the court to leave a case pending until the parties are ready to proceed.
Under the “waiver” approach, the court looks to the defendant to see if he intended that the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act not apply to him. If it was defendant’s intent that The Act not apply, it does not. Unfortunately, it is most often counsel and not the defendant who attempts to waive the provisions of The Act. A defendant may want to proceed with haste, but defense counsel, burdened by a heavy caseload, may want to delay trial. The “waiver” approach allows counsel to waive the provisions of The Act, which may harm the defense and create further hardships for the defendant.
While not completely rejected, the “waiver” approach is looked on with disfavor because The Act was not only meant to protect a defendant’s rights, but was “also designed with the public interest firmly in mind”. Therefore, a defendant generally cannot waive the provisions of The Act; nonetheless, the “waiver” approach has been accepted by courts in recognition that defendants may attempt to play games with The Act to get a dismissal on a technicality never intended by Congress. As one court explained it, “Where the public’s interest in swift justice is not disregarded, such an exception makes good sense. The reason is plain. The provisions of the Speedy Trial Act are not to be mistaken for the rules of a game where defense counsel’s cunning strategy may effectively subvert Congress’ goal of implementing sound trial management.”
d. Unavailable Witnesses
The Speedy Trial Act is filled with other loopholes subject to abuse. The Act allows exclusion of time for “Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of… an essential witness.” There are at least two potential problems with this exclusion.
First, if the government needs additional time to prepare for trial, it can simply designate an unavailable person as an essential witness. This tactic was apparently used in the matter of United States v. McNeil. In the McNeil matter, on the day set for trial, the government moved for a continuance based on the unavailability of an essential witness who was in custody in another state. The court granted the motion, but when the witness eventually testified during trial, it became apparent that his testimony was not essential to the government’s case. Mr. McNeil was convicted, but appealed on the Speedy Trial issue, arguing that the continuance was improper. The reviewing court agreed, and the conviction was overturned because the witness was not essential, and it was, therefore, improper to exclude from the Speedy Trial clock the delay caused by the witness’s unavailability. Even so, the reversal was a rather hollow victory, since the trial court was given discretion to “dismiss the indictments with or without prejudice.”
Second, if the government needs additional time to prepare for trial, the government can make an essential witness “unavailable”. The matter of United States v. Eagle Hawk exemplifies this loophole. In Eagle Hawk, the government indicted a witness, and then “asserted that [the witness’s] testimony was essential, and that he was unavailable since the government could not make him testify prior to his own trial.” The government argued that because the witness was unavailable, the time the witness’s trial was pending should be excluded. The trial court agreed and excluded the time the witness was unavailable by virtue of his right against self incrimination. The Court of Appeals confirmed that “once a witness is under indictment for the same offense as that to which he is requested to testify, fifth amendment safeguards render this witness unavailable for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.”, so the delay was deemed acceptable.
Under The Speedy Trial Act, a case may be dismissed without prejudice to the government’s ability to again charge the defendant with the same offense. Naturally, if charges are dismissed and then refilled, further delays will result.
“In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice [under the Speedy Trial Act], the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [The Speedy Trial Act] and on the administration of justice.” The more serious an offense is, the more weight the court gives to allowing the government to reinstitute the prosecution. This is based on the belief that “[t]he graver the crimes, the greater the insult to societal interests if the charges are dropped, once and for all, without a meaningful determination of guilt or innocence”; however, it could be argued that the graver the crime, the greater the need for a speedy trial to ensure justice. By giving such weight to the seriousness of the crime, prosecutors may have less of a sense of urgency to bring serious matters to trial, since the repercussions of delay may be minimal.
The Speedy Trial Act does not apply to all offenses; rather, it only applies to felonies and more serious misdemeanor offenses. However, even petty offenses can carry up to six months jail time each, and multiple petty offenses can be brought at the same time to yield an even longer possible sentence. Nor does The Act apply to civil matters, such as entering the country without authorization. Some such civil offenses can result in indefinite incarceration. This loophole in could be abused in several ways.
First, the government could arrest a person, allow a substantial delay, and then charge the person with a petty offense. Being a petty offense, the defendant would not be entitled to a dismissal under The Act, but the government could later bring additional, more serious, charges that would have brought the defendant within the provisions of The Act had those charges been filed first. The order of bringing charges could subvert the purpose of The Act. This loophole could be used to facilitate an extended detention while the government completed its investigation into the more serious charges.
Second, if faced with the imminent dismissal of charges because of a Speedy Trial Act violation, the government could simply reduce the pending charges to be petty offenses and thus cure the defect. Once cured, the government could then re-indict or re-charge the defendant by way of Information, thus restarting the speedy trial clock.
Third, if faced with the imminent dismissal of charges because of a Speedy Trial Act violation, the government could reduce pending charges to petty offenses and proceed to trial. The government could then use the facts of the original charges as circumstances in aggravation to argue for consecutive sentencing, use the facts of the original charges to argue for upward departures, or use the fact of the conviction and facts of the original charges in support of a motion to terminate probation.
Counsel can stop time from accruing under The Act by simply filing a motion.
The case against Adalberto Franco-Montoya exemplifies the point. No trial had been set in the matter, but “fifty-seven days passed on the speedy trial clock”. Before trial was set, the prosecution filed a motion in limine regarding some evidentiary issues. The court then set the matter for trial some forty-three days after the date the motion in limine was filed. When more than seventy total days had passed, “Franco filed a motion alleging a violation of the Speedy Trial Act.” Franco argued, inter alia, that the prosecution’s motion was brought to circumvent the Speedy Trial Act, but the court did not agree. The court ruled that the motion in limine stopped the Speedy Trial clock, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
This loophole gives the government almost unfettered ability to stop the speedy trial clock at will by simply holding meritorious or even frivolous motions in reserve until needed to stop the clock. An attorney can be sanctioned for filing “a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit”; but the motion nevertheless stops the clock because the Act “does not contain a requirement that the merits of a motion be assessed before a delay is permitted”.
One would hope that government attorneys would not abuse this ability, but it is simply strategic to keep an arsenal of generic clock stopping motions at the ready, such as a Motion to Discover Defense Evidence, Motion to Admit Prior Bad Acts, Motion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, or Motion to Exclude Unauthenticated Evidence, since such motions can be used to prevent a Speedy Trial Act dismissal in almost any criminal case.
Courts have even ruled that Speedy Trial Act time limits do not commence until a person is being held to answer to federal charge; thus, a defendant held by state officers on state charges, but later turned over to federal authorities for federal charges, does not start accruing time under The Act until the defendant has been delivered into federal custody.
The saving grace of the Act is found at 18 U.S.C. §3173, “No provision of [the Act] shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution.”
In addition to the mathematical, formalistic structure of the Act, defendants still enjoy the speedy trial rights conferred by the Sixth Amendment.
The primary benefit of proving a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation is that the only remedy is dismissal with prejudice. Conversely, the Speedy Trial Act allows a dismissal to be with or without prejudice and gives neither remedy preference.
A dismissal based on the Act is based on a firm number of days and a strict structure, but to obtain a dismissal on Sixth Amendment grounds, a defendant must “show that on balance, four separate factors weigh in his favor: whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result...”.
The Sixth Amendment is also applicable to state prosecutions, whereas the Speedy Trial Act only applies to federal prosecutions.
To help show a Sixth Amendment violation, in either state or federal court, counsel should make an early request for a speedy trial and an early request to preserve evidence. Counsel should then keep detailed notes as to reasons for delay and the effect of delay on witnesses and evidence.
A speedy trial is one commenced quickly enough that time has not significantly eroded evidence, but few trials are speedy. Generally, the defendant, defense counsel, the prosecution, and the court must agree before a trial is speedy, yet each may have motive to delay trial.
a. The Guilty May Benefit from Delay
“[I]t is almost universally accepted that delay favors the defendant”, but this is simply not true. In truth, delay favors injustice. Time degrades or destroys both evidence of guilt and evidence of innocence, and time fades the memories of witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense. The reason many incorrectly perceive benefit to defendants is the disproportionate number of guilty defendants compared to those who are factually innocent.
“The vast majority of people charged with crime in America are guilty. Thank God for that. Would anybody want to live in a country where the vast majority of people tried for crimes were innocent? … [I]n America, of course the majority of people charged with crime are guilty, and we want to keep it that way.”
One who knows he is guilty and fears his guilt will be proven may gain by delay. Adverse witnesses may die, disappear or, as happens in many domestic violence cases, simply change their minds about testifying. Evidence of guilt may be lost or destroyed, and the prosecutor, faced with a heavy case load and limited time, may decide to offer more favorable deals as time passes.
b. Defense Counsel May Benefit from Delay
Many private attorneys are retained on a flat rate basis. If their client pleads to a crime, counsel saves time that would otherwise be devoted to trial. The longer trial is pending, the greater chance that the matter will be disposed of without trial, so counsel stands to make more profit with less work by delaying.
Similarly, appointed attorneys are often crushed by a tremendous caseload and have little time to devote to any particular matter. A trial can consume weeks, months, or even longer, which is time that could be devoted to other cases. By delaying trial, the appointed attorney also has a better chance that the defendant will take a plea or that the case will be otherwise disposed of, which will free counsel’s time to devote to other defendants.
c. The Prosecution May Benefit from Delay
Prosecuting attorneys also suffer from heavy case loads, and have a desire to dispose of cases without necessity of trial. “The great majority of criminal cases are disposed of by pleas of guilty…”, and by delaying trial, the prosecution has a better chance that the defendant will take a plea.
With a plea, the prosecutor enhances his resume by increasing his conviction rate, but if he proceeds to trial he chances an acquittal or a mistrial, either of which could be time consuming and embarrassing.
After an extended jail stay, an innocent defendant may even willingly plead guilty to a crime he did not commit in exchange for “credit for time served” instead of remaining in jail longer and then facing a trial that could result in even more time in custody. To expedite plea agreements, defendants are even allowed to stand on their claims of innocence, yet plead guilty.
d. The Court May Benefit from Delay
Judges also have heavy caseloads, and courts are overcrowded, so judges may also benefit by the increased number of dispositions that come with increased delays. “If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”
e. Justice Does Not Benefit from Delay
“Justice delayed is justice denied.” Delay takes away witnesses and evidence. Delay punishes defendants before they have been convicted and punishes society by having it bear the cost of extended pretrial incarceration or by allowing criminals to remain out of custody to potentially commit more crimes. Delay benefits the guilty, but harms the innocent.
The Speedy Trial Act places almost no reasonable restrictions on how long a case can be delayed, but such delays are almost always to the determent of justice.
 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)
 Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174
 See U.S. v. Bullock, 551 F. 2nd 1377 (5th Cir. 1977)
 U.S. v. Jones, 602 F Supp 1045 (E.D. Pa 1985)
 18 U.S.C. §3173
 18 U.S.C. §3161(b)
 18 U.S.C. §3161(c)
 This common quote has been attributed to Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969)
 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1)(A)
 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1)(D)
 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(3)(A)
 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A)
 Dismissal for delay in bringing indictment (18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)) or dismissal for delay in commencing trial (18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2))
 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A)
 U.S. v. Gonzalez-Rincon, 36 F. 3rd 859, 865 (9th Cir.1994)
 U.S. v. Verderame, 51 F.3rd 249 (11th Cir. 1995)
 People v. Maddox, 67 Cal. 2nd 647 (1967)
 People v. Wilkins, 225 Cal. App. 3rd 299, 305 (1990)
 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)
 U.S. v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296 (1st Cir. 1994)
 U.S. v. Hill, 197 F.3d 436, 442-443 (10th Cir. 1999)
 U.S. v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1130-1131 (9th Cir. 2002)
 U.S. v. Murray, 771 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1985)
 See also U.S. v. Jean, 25 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 1994) where the prosecution was allowed to speak in camera after failing to prove complexity.
 U.S. v. Jordan, 915 F. 2nd 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1990); see also U.S. v. Pollock, 726 F. 2nd 1456 (9th Cir. 1984), which first set out the rule as “an ‘ends of justice’ exclusion under section 3161(b) is proper only if ordered for a specific period of time” (id. at 1461).
 U.S. v. Lattany, 982 F.2nd 866 (3rd Cir. 1992)
 U.S. v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 677 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); see also U.S. v. Gambino, 59 F. 3rd 353 (2nd Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Kington, 875 F. 2nd 1091, 1108 (5th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Pringle, 751 F. 2nd 419, 434-35 (1st Cir. 1984)
 Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489 (2006); see also U.S. v. Willis, 958 F. 2nd 60 (5th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Oberoi, 547 F. 3rd 436 (2nd Cir. 2008)
 Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489, 500 (2006); see also U.S. v. Willis, 958 F. 2nd 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Keith, 42 F. 3rd 234, 238 (4th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Kucik, 909 F. 2nd 206, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1070 (1991); U.S. v. Ray, 768 F. 2nd 991, 998 n.11 (11th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Carrasquillo, 667 F. 2nd 382, 388-390 (3rd Cir. 1982). U.S. v. Berberian, 851 F. 2nd 236, 239, (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989)
 U.S. v. Gambino, 59 F. 3rd 353, 360 (2nd Cir. 1995)
 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(3)(A)
 U.S. v. McNeil, 911 F. 2nd 768 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
 id. at 775
 U.S. v. Eagle Hawk, 815 F. 2nd 1213 (8th Cir. 1987)
 id. at 1219
 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)
 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)
 U.S. v. Koory, 20 F. 3rd 844 (8th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Gambino, 59 F. 3rd 353 (2nd Cir. 1995)
 U.S. v. Hastings, 847 F.2nd 920 (1st Cir. 1988)
 The Speedy Trial Act is applicable to “any Federal criminal offense which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is triable by any court established by Act of Congress (other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction, or an offense triable by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal)” (18 U.S.C. §3172(2)); see also U.S. v. Sued-Jimenez, 275 F. 3rd 1 (Dist. of Puerto Rico 2001), cert denied (2002) 535 U.S. 1019
 “[T]he term “petty offense” means a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction” (18 U.S.C §19)
 18 U.S.C. §3581
 See generally U.S. v. Santisteban, 127 F. Supp. 2nd 1304 (Dist.of Puerto Rico 2000); see also U.S. v. Boyd, 214 F. 3rd 1052 (9th Cir. 2000), where the court found that The Speedy Trial Act did not apply to a petty offense, even though it was later combined with a more serious misdemeanor; Lewis v. U.S., 518 U.S. 322 (1996), where two petty offenses were combined, but defendant only received a six month sentence.
 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i), “An alien present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the U.S. at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”
 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1)(D) ; see also U.S. v. Rojo-Alvarez, 944 F. 2nd 959 (1st Cir. 1991), rehearing denied, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 51 F. 3rd 264; U.S. v. Savoca, 739 F. 2nd 220 (6th Cir. 1984), on rehearing 761 F. 2nd 292, certiorari denied 474 U.S. 852; U.S. v. Robinson, 731 F. Supp. 1343 (S.D. Ill. 1989); U.S.. v. Titlbach, 339 F. 3rd 692 (8th Cir. 2003).
 U.S. v. Rojo-Alvarez, 944 F. 2nd 959 (1st Cir. 1991)
 id. at 965
 18 U.S.C. §3162(b)(2)
 U.S. v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1995)
 Fed R. Crim. Proc. R. 16(b)(1)
 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)
 Fed. R. Evid. 403
 Fed. R. Evid. 901
 U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)
 U.S. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982)
 id. at 8
 18 U.S.C. §§3161 et seq.
 See for example, U.S. v. Shahryar, 719 F. 2nd 1522 (11th Cir. 1983).
 U.S. v. Elmardoudi, 501 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Doggett v. U.S., 505 US 647 (1992) and U.S. v. Shell, 974 F2d 1035 (9th Cir 1992).
 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2)
 U.S. v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 335 (1988)
 U.S. v. Thomas, 55 F. 3rd 144, 148-49 (4th Cir. 1995), listing the four factors first set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); see also U.S. v. Muniz, 1 F. 3rd 1018, 1024 (10th Cir. 1993)).
 Matthew Bender & Company, Criminal Trial Techniques §1.02(2)(c) (2005); see also U.S. v. Sizemore, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 572 (1953), “The trial of a criminal offense is a practical business and delays favor an accused.”, but see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 526 (1972), “it is not necessarily true that delay benefits the defendant”.
 Alan M. Dershowitz, Trials of the Century, Barnes & Nobile Audio, Lecture 5, Disk 3, Track 9 (2006)
 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
 American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (1967) p. 60
 Marcia Clark, prosecutor in the O.J. Simpson murder trial, springs to mind as a humiliating ordeal for the prosecution, but her book (“Without a Doubt”, Marcia Clark and Teresa Carpenter, Viking Press (1997) ISBN 0-670-87089-7) and television deals (special correspondent for Entertainment Tonight) tend to refute the theory that losing is undesirable.
 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); People v. West, 3 Cal. 3rd 595 (1970)
 See generally In re: Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924 (1992)
 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)
 William Gladstone, Politician, 1809-1898.